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Cornhusker Economics
Safety First Risk Preferences and Post-Harvest Grain Marketing
A Context-rich Lab Experiment
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

*

4 Wks
Ago

124.00

2-28-20

*

180.85

176.98

179.59

145.98

150.40

146.74

219.98

214.78

206.34

44.81

*

*

59.64

77.21

64.05

134.24

NA

160.41

374.77

421.58

424.41

4.03

4.37

4.10

3.52

3.68

3.64

8.06

8.27

8.36

5.45

5.91

5.74

3.13

3.32

3.18

175.00

*

*
*

105.00

107.50

92.50

95.00

95.00

144.50

149.00

141.58

50.00

50.00

50.67

Improving our understanding of the influence of riskpreferences on decision making represents an important objective for understanding behavior, designing policy and decision making theory. A natural place this problem persists is
in the marketing of grain (Kastens and Dhuyvetter, 1999).
Grain marketing research has primarily focused on the use of
different marketing techniques that result in lower price risk
and, therefore, lower income risk (Musser, Patrick, Eckman,
1996). However, the extent to which the theoretical findings
from these studies are relevant to real-world applications is
not clear (Brorsen and Irwin, 1996; Garcia and Leuthold,
2004). While reducing income risk is desired, this approach
overlooks the influence of producer risk preferences when
marketing grain. In this article we evaluate the role of producer risk preferences, specifically Safety-First (SF)risk preferences (Roy 1952) on grain marketing decision behavior with
emphasis on post-harvest grain marketing.
The idea behind SF is that individuals consider outcomes
below a particular value as a disaster. Each individual would
have his/her own disaster level. For farmers, a disaster could
mean losing the farm or losing money in a particular crop
year. Producers exhibiting SF risk preferences will make onfarm decisions in a way to minimize the probability of
achieving the disaster. For example, Fishburn (1997) found
decision makers do associate risk with failure to meet a target
return. Heady (1952) presented that farmers exhibit SF preferences by allocating acres to particular crops in an attempt
to minimize the probability of income falling below a disaster
level defined as production costs. Given this context, we used
a grain marketing simulation game to conduct a context-rich
economic experiment with university student subjects to
evaluate the role of SF risk preferences on grain marketing
decision behavior.
For our economic experiment and given our focus on SF risk
preferences, we relied on the work by Levy and Levy (2009)
to identify whether experimental subjects exhibit SF risk
preferences. This information is then combined with postharvest grain marketing decisions made during the experi-
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ment within the simulated grain marketing interphases where
subjects create contracts for spot or future grain delivery under
four different grain price scenarios.
Price Scenarios and Grain Marketing
The four price treatments were selected from marketing years
with specific price characteristics. In all treatments the spot
price at harvest, i.e. the cash price for October, was above the
production cost which was 3.8 Experimental Currency Units
(ECU) per bushel. However, the spot price did not exceed 4.1
ECUs per bushel. In Treatment 1 (hereafter “Stable” Price Series or T1), the expected price for each month was, on average,
4.2 ECUs with a standard deviation of 0.16. The minimum net
price displayed was 3.5 ECUs and the maximum available price
in T1 was 4.1 ECUs. In Treatment 2 (hereafter “Decreasing”
Price Series or T2), prices followed a decreasing trend with the
expected price per month, on average, being 3.8 ECUs per
bushel with a standard deviation of 0.09. This parameterization
led to a minimum net price of 2.5 ECUs per bushel and a maximum net price of 4 ECUs per bushel. The T2 series was constructed using actual price data from the 2002 marketing year
and had no carry opportunities. Treatment 3 (hereafter
“Erratic” Price Series or T3) had both increasing and decreasing
trends changing multiple times throughout the year. The expected price per month was, on average, 4.7 ECUs with a standard deviation of 0.31, minimum net price of 3.2 ECUs and maximum net price of 5.4 ECUs. T3 was developed from information on 2003 marketing year prices. Finally, in Treatment 4
(hereafter “Increasing Price Series or T4), prices were increasing from month to month. The expected price per month was,
on average, 5.5 ECUs with a standard deviation of 0.62, minimum net price of 3.9 ECUs, and maximum net price of 6.4
ECUs. The T4 series was created using 2006 prices. This price
series had the highest net price of all treatments and its lowest
net price did not fall below production costs of 3.8 ECUs per
bushel. In all other treatments the minimum net price didn’t
cover the production cost.
Experimental Design
The experiment had three stages. The first stage involved elicitation of the risk attitude of the experimental subjects following
Levy and Levy (2009). In the second stage, subjects participated
in an experiment involving selling a fixed endowment of the
post-harvest crop during different months of four years to maximize their profits. Each year began in October as typically this
is the month in which producers start selling their corn and
soybean harvests (USDA Agricultural Handbook Number 628,
1997) and ended in September of the next year. Decisions were
made at the beginning of each month giving rise to 12 decision
points for each year. Finally, in the third stage, participants took
a non-paying survey which included questions about their general understanding of probabilities and expected value,
knowledge of farming and grain marketing and some demographic characters.
Stage 2 of the experiment was implemented through the grain
marketing interphase – Marketing in a New Era (MINE)
(Kotsakou et al. 2018) in which subjects were aware that the
item they were selling was an agricultural commodity; thus,
considerably increasing the salience of our experimental findings.

The price scenario treatment was implemented in a withinsubjects design. At the beginning of a marketing year, participants were informed that (i) the prices they would face in
different years were independent of each other, (ii) their performance (measured by their profit) would not be influenced
by the same in previous years and that (iii) all prices displayed would be net of storage cost of $0.07 ECUs per bushel.
Subjects started the experiment with the same grain endowment (117,500 bushels) and had the same storage cost (0.07
ECUs per bushel). The total production cost was fixed at
446,500 ECUs for all participants and under all treatments.
The only marketing period price with a zero storage cost was
the spot price in October, the first month of the marketing
year.
Decision making in a month involved subjects selling grain
in 5,000 bushel increments. At every decision-making stage
in a month, a table containing grain prices was displayed. The
first price in the first row of the first column was the price
offered in the spot market in October for immediate delivery.
All other price information pertained to futures delivery i.e.
the subject would receive the price they locked-in to sell their
grain at minus the storage cost that is associated with storing
the harvested grain until the month of sale. To facilitate decision making, subjects could sell grain in batches of 5000,
10,000, 15,000, 20,000, or 25,000 bushels during a month. If
multiple transactions were made during a month, information pertaining to the details of each transaction
(including the amount contracted and sold – if a spot contract and contracted price and month of sale if a future contract) was individually displayed along with information
about total storage cost and total revenue before subjects proceeded to the next month. Subjects were informed that grain
would not be carried over from one year to the next. Thus, if
subjects had any grain remaining in September of the next
year, this amount would be sold by the computer at the spot
price for September.
Before proceeding to the next marketing year, subjects were
provided detailed information about all their decisions in the
current year including total earnings and total storage cost
incurred. On the left side of the screen, all sales and storage
expenses were listed in chronological order starting from the
most recent transaction (charge or sale). On the right side of
the screen, earnings for that year were displayed. The results
screen also indicated the number of years remaining until the
conclusion of Stage 2.
To facilitate subject understanding, in addition to instruction
handouts and a presentation by the experimenter, there was a
practice year with two months during which they had to
make decisions. The price series used in the practice period
was different from the price series used in the treatments.
Subjects were paid on the basis of decisions made in Stages 1
and 2. Subject’s total earnings were converted to real U.S.
dollars at an exchange rate of $1 per 12,611 ECUs earned in
the experiment. With a flat show-up fee of $7, on average
participants earned $22 with a standard deviation of $6.82, a
minimum of $7 and a maximum of $40. This study was conducted with undergraduate and graduate students from the
University of Nebraska in Lincoln as well as vocational stu-

dents from the Nebraska College of Technical Agriculture
(NCTA) in Curtis, Nebraska who receive specialized training in
both commodity and animal agriculture. Subjects were randomly
recruited from the University campus in Lincoln and a convenience sample was recruited from the much smaller student body
at NCTA to give rise to a data set of 131 students who participated in our experiments lasting for two hours. Data was collected
between January and April of 2017.
Empirical Estimation Strategy
Our empirical approach is to identify the effects of SF risk preferences on bushels contracted by month. Elements like marketing
knowledge, age, gender, and experiment knowledge could have
contributed to the number of bushels sold. Therefore we estimate
the following equation:

and continuous variables for factors that may influence
hedging. These include Campus location (Lincoln or Curtis), familiarity with grain marketing (four categories ranging from not familiar to familiar); participant age (a continuous variable); expected value (a question on whether the
participant understood the expected value concept); clear
instructions (whether instructions were clear); and first experiment. are
estimated parameters; and Ꜫit
represents the error term. The constant represents someone
who displayed no SF risk preferences, a particular treatment,
a particular order, and one dummy variable from each category in the control group. Equation 1 is estimated using two
specifications. The first specification represents all bushels
sold, regardless of contract type. The second specification
represents bushels sold as cash contracts.
Results

where represents the percent of bushels sold (bushels sold/
bushels in storage) by subject i in year t; SF represents a vector
taking the value 1 if producers displayed SF risk preference, and
zero otherwise; Mixed SF represents a vector taking the value 1 if
producers displayed a mix of SF risk preferences (i.e., they answered some questions SF and others not), and zero otherwise
(both these variables were computed on the basis of data from
Stage 1 of the experiment); Treatment represents a matrix of
price treatment effects where there is a dummy variable for each
price treatment; Order represents a matrix order effect where
there is a dummy variable for each order in which prices were
presented to subjects; Controls represents a matrix of

Figure 1. Total Bushels sold by month

Figure 2. Spot Market Bushels sold by month

Figures 1 and 2 describe the average number of bushels sold
by month and for the spot market. The difference between
bushels sold by month and spot market represents forward
contracts (Note that positive returns to the carry did exist in
one of the four price series. Meaning that it was financially
beneficial to sell now for delivery in the future.) Visually,
there is a very small difference between people on the basis
of their risk types when looking at bushels sold, whereas for
spot market sales, we see a substantially higher amount sold
for those with SF risk preferences.

We estimate two models, each estimated by month containing a
large number of variables. Thus, we present only partial marginal
effects important to our hypothesis about the influence of SF
preferences on grain marketing decisions. Table 1 displays the
role of SF risk preferences for both models across the first six
months of the storage period (October-March). The estimated
relation between SF risk preferences and the number of bushels
sold is insignificant for each month except for February (at 10%
significance). For February we find a positive relation, indicating
those with SF risk preferences sell 4% more than those without
SF risk preferences. For the months not shown, no significant
results were found between SF and bushels sold. Moving to the
percent of bushels sold on the spot market, we find positive and
significant results (at least at the 10% level of significance) for the
first three months of the storage period. In October, SF risk preferences sold 18% more than those without SF risk preferences.
For November and December, the difference is 4% and 11%,
respectively. No significant results were found for the months
not shown.
Thus, our results suggest risk preferences, specifically SF risk
preferences, do indeed influence the amount of grain sold. SF
risk preferences appear to impact the amount of grain sold in
two ways. First, those with SF risk preferences use spot market
sales more than forward contracts. We see this result from lack
of significant difference in SF estimate for total bushels sold,
whereas for the spot market sales, we find evidence of significant
differences in the percent of bushels sold per month. Second,
those with SF risk preferences sell more in the months right after
harvest as is evident in the positive and significant differences in
spot market bushels sold in those months.
Discussion

economic methodology within a unique context-rich grain
marketing simulation game. Our findings suggest that SF
risk preferences impact the decision to sell grain and that
this impact comes in two ways. First, those with SF risk preferences appear to prefer cash contracts. Second, these individuals sell more grain in the months right after harvest.
Both of these results appear to be reasonable given SF risk
preferences whereby the person would behave in order to
avert disaster. First, using cash contracts implies a cash
transfer right away vs selling now for future delivery where
there is the possibility of grain going out of condition and/or
the elevator not being around when delivery occurs. Second,
selling in the months immediately after harvest reduces net
income risk as bushels are converted to dollars right away.
The results have important implications for decision making.
Our results suggest that there is a segment of the population
following SF risk preferences who will focus on the use of
cash contracts, despite financial opportunities resulting in
higher net income. Our findings established that one should
not expect everyone to take advantage of all commodity
marketing ideas/concepts.
The results of our study provide systematic evidence of concepts about the importance of SF risk preferences to producer decision making. However, we should exercise caution
when generalizing these results given the student subject
data base. External validity and generalizability of the results
would require that we conduct these experiments with actual
producers. Additionally, it is important to evaluate the degree to which risk preferences impact marketing decisions in
the pre-harvest setting under different grain price scenarios.
These are the subject matter of current ongoing research.

In this project we investigated the role of SF risk preferences in
post-harvest grain marketing decisions using the experimental

Table 1. Regression Results
Month
Dependent
Variable

Parameter

October

November

December

January

February

March

Safety First

-0.14
(0.16)

-0.04
(0.09)

0.05
(0.04)

-0.01
(0.06)

0.04*
(0.02)

0.001
(0.03)

Safety First

0.18**
(0.08)

0.04*
(0.02)

0.11***
(0.03)

0.03
(0.03)

0.02
(0.01)

0.02
(0.02)

Total
Bushels Sold

Total Bushels
Sold on
Spot Market

Note: Standard errors in the parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted by *, ** and ***
for 0.01, 0.05,and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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